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Autonomous Propellant Loading (APL)
• Part of NASA’s Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) mission.
• Develop and demonstrate systems for autonomous control of 
cryogenic propellant loading processes
• Demonstrate certification of Class B, safety critical autonomous 
propellant loading software for monitoring and controlling UPSS LOX 
and LCH4 ground systems and SCV Customer’s Rocket Cryogenic 
Propulsion System
• Certified Cryogenic Loading Facility for SCV Activities using LO2/LCH4
• Capable of supporting customer rocket configuration testing
• Excellent training facility for commercial and government operator 
training (skills and processes maturation)
APL Project Milestones
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• FY15 (July), Demonstrate Multi-stage Autonomous 
Propellant Loading Using Simulation
• FY16 (July), Demonstrate Multi-stage Autonomous 
Propellant Parallel Loading using LN2
• FY17 (March), Demonstrate Multi-stage Autonomous 
Propellant Parallel Loading using LCH4 and LO2 Commodity
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Autonomy
• Autonomy: the ability for a system to apply self-directed intelligence 
and adaptation in order to produce a successful response to 
unanticipated situations.
• There are degrees of autonomy, ranging from low levels to high levels.
• It is an evolutionary capability that can handle increasing degrees of 
complexity for reasoning and decision making.
• It must know the condition of the system elements and their ability to 
carry out the task. Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) then 
becomes an enabler for autonomy.
Strategies for Autonomy
• Strategies for autonomy guide the decision making process. 
• Ex: What to do when an element cannot be used? There must be 
a strategy to replace the function of that element in the current 
mission plan.
• Autonomy is scripted to apply strategies, but it is more powerful when 
scripted at a high level of abstraction, that is, at a more generic 
KNOWLEDGE level where concepts are used instead of just data and 
information.
Autonomous Control
• Autonomous Control (AC) refers to control actions of a system that 
take place without intervention from humans.
• AC denotes control actions that respond to events that are 
unexpected, and enable the system to continue on a path to achieve 
an original objective or alternate objectives.
• Autonomous Control incorporates concepts such as adaptation, 
mitigation, and re-planning in space and time.
APL Fault Detection
3 Parts to APL Fault Detection:
– Known Failure Case: Failures Identified by FMEA including critical 
failures and associated mitigations and instrumentation only failures
– Potential Failure Case: Sensor redlines based on engineering 
judgment
‒ Exceeding sensor redlines will terminate loading sequence and 
initiate drain, team will evaluate data post drain and determine if 
redline value is valid and if failure occurred – potential to update 
FMEA if team determines new failure mode not previously 
identified
– Less Likely  Failure Case: Trending of sensors data using loading 
data and pattern recognition (Artificial Neural Net - ANN) to identify 
when sensor data is out of nominal but not exceeding redline limits
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Architecture-Description
The APL AO-MDS system includes the following modules and interactions.
Autonomous Control: It includes the Sequencer Engine and a Sequence Plan sub-modules. This module enables creation, 
validation (by simulation of values), and execution of sequences. The module can be locked to stop any commanding to real 
hardware and allow usage of simulated and/or playback data.
Domain Map Module: Is where all elements of the UPSS system are represented as object instances. It is created from schematics, 
and configures according to schematics and processes of the UPSS. The representation is graphical (e.g. piping diagrams) but every 
icon represents an object with a wealth of data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) that is used for inferencing and decision making. 
Real-time data from the UPSS is streamed using an SPP Bridge for real-time operations. The real-time data can be locked in order to 
stream data that may come from files. This non-real-time data may be used for replay of actual tests. Simulation data can also be 
streamed.
Analysis Graphics Module: Provides plotting capability for data. 
Integrated System Health Management - Root Cause Analysis: Includes capability for ISHM, such as anomaly detection, 
diagnosis, prognosis, reporting of anomalies, etc. Any number of users can Access any module of the ISHM-AC System from any 
computer that is in the network. 
MPCDU: Mobile Power Command and Data Unit.
G2 SPP Bridge: A G2 Space Packet Protocol (SPP) UDP network interface for ground and vehicle (Iron Rocket) side I/O.
CCSDS/SPP to CIP Gateway: A 2 -way interface used to convert between SPP and ground side CIP.
Allen Bradley PLC: Programmable Logic Controllers that operate the UPSS ground systems.
Simulator (SIM) Lock: Controls whether G2 PLC tag values (and possible avionics commands) are supplied by Simulator or direct 
I/O with SPP/CIP PLC bridge/Avionics Interface. 
LabViews Tag Simulator: A G2 development and test simulator used to set ground PLC tag values via an OPC server connected to 
PLCs.
Software and Hardware 
Architectures
• The software must enable the creation of a domain model of the system 
which encapsulates information and knowledge about all elements of 
the system and processes that can take place throughout the system (a 
knowledge base).
• The software and hardware architectures must perform data, 
information and knowledge (DIaK) management, such that data and 
information is available to any element of the system when needed and 
for the right context.
APL Control Domain Representation
Autonomous Mission Task Execution
High Level AO-MDS Architecture
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AO-MDS: Extensible Model Libraries
Concepts and Models
Flow Subsystem as a Concept
Flow Subsystem 1: Members (TK1, pp1, T1, P1, pp2, pp3, V2, pp6, pp9, T3, P3, V5, T2, P2, F1, TK2), Source: TK1, Sink: TK2.
Flow Subsystem 1: Members (TK1, pp1, T1, P1, pp2, pp4, V3, pp7, pp9, T3, P3, V5, T2, P2, F1, TK2), Source: TK1, Sink: TK2.
Note: AO-MDS  incorporates the concept of Flow Subsystem and dynamically determines Flow Subsystems for any application 
and its current configuration.
In Contrast with a data/information driven approach:
Flow subsystem selected from a pre-defined list that considers all possible combinations 
of valve configurations for all schematics
• Generally hundreds or thousands of valves are involved, becoming a complex combinatorial problem.
• Any changes in the system (e.g. adding a valve) will require extensive work to update the combinatorial list.
• Any new system will require its own combinatorial list.
Failures Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Modeling based on MIL-STD-1629A(2)
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Agile Development Process
Quest for Software Quality
‒ “BDD is about implementing an application by describing its behavior from the 
perspective of its stakeholders”
Re-factoring Process
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Results
• AO-MDS used to develop and deploy 3 large scale NASA AO solutions 
in 3 years (KSC, SSC)
• Re-use delivered 5 time speed-up in modeling (involving over 10,000 
domain elements)
• Over 80% of functionality remains generic
• Quest for Class B Safety Critical Certification of AO-MDS currently in 
progress
• APL validated using physics based simulation
• Demonstration included unanticipated failures
• AO-MDS solution performed at 100%
‒ No false positives
‒ No false negatives
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